The No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act required states to adopt accountability systems measuring student proficiency on state administered exams. The federal legislation contained several strict requirements for NCLB implementation, such as escalating student proficiency targets that reach 100 percent proficiency by 2014. But it also gave states considerable flexibility to interpret and implement components of NCLB. Using a data set we constructed, this paper is the first national study examining which schools failed during the early years of NCLB and which performance targets they failed to meet. We explore how states' NCLB implementation decisions were related to their schools' failure rates, which ranged from less than 1 percent to more than 80 percent across states. Wide cross-state variation in failure rates resulted from how states' decisions interacted with each other and with school characteristics like enrollment size, grade span, and ethnic diversity. Subtle differences in policy implementation may cause dramatic differences in measured outcomes.
I. Introduction
The American public education system has had a history of strong local community control of public schools. U.S. public schools are predominantly funded through a combination of state and local tax revenues. Since the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the federal government has been supplementing these revenues by awarding funds to states for allocation to public schools serving students from low-income families. These federally-funded revenues are known as "Title I funding." Cohen and Moffit (2009) describe how the first 35 years of Title I funding included several rounds of debates concerning schools' flexibility in using their Title I funds and whether the impacts of Title I funds on student achievement should be evaluated. Interest in preserving America's history of strong local control of schools sometimes clashed with desires to attach strings to Title I funding to increase its efficacy as a poverty reduction program. Local control generally won the day during those first 35 years. The relative size of the Title I program did not grow (3.6% of public school revenues in [1969] [1970] and only 2.6% in 1999-2000 1 ), nor did a national system emerge to evaluate whether Title I funds were improving student achievement. States and school districts arguably had greater incentives to monitor the fiscal compliance of their Title I funds than to assess whether these funds were going to the most productive outlets (Gordon and Reber, 2015) . Several federal administrations during that time encouraged the adoption of national standards and the development of state accountability systems for schools, but these were voluntary (Manna, 2006) .
In 2001, the re-authorization of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act marked the single greatest expansion of the federal role in education policy since the original 1965 Act (Manna, 2010) . This re-authorization, known as the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, broke new ground by mandating schools be held accountable for their students' achievement as a condition of states' receipt of Title I funds. NCLB requires states to construct school accountability systems using standardized tests to measure student proficiency rates in math and English Language Arts (ELA). A school fails to make Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) if proficiency rates fall short of that year's targets. This AYP determination was based not only on the proficiency rates of schools' general student populations but also on the proficiency rates of various ethnic and categorical subgroups of students, such as students from low-income families. , 2001, 2006) . Title I funding remained equivalent to only about 3 percent of total public school operating expenditures, though this percentage remains much higher for some school districts than others. NCLB did not establish an evaluation system for the impact of Title funds, or funding in general, on student achievement. One of the few direct changes to the use of Title I funds was to allow students from low-income families to purchase after-school tutoring services (called supplemental education services), by re-directing Title I funds away from schools that had failed to make AYP. Rather than holding states or schools accountable for the use of Title I funds, NCLB forced states to hold schools accountable for their students' proficiency rates.
From NCLB's inception, federal policymakers avoided a "one size fits all" policy and encouraged states to adapt NCLB guidelines to meet the demands of their particular contexts.
For example, states could choose their own exams and set definitions of proficiency on those exams. Many states already had their own testing and accountability systems prior to NCLB, and so the impact of NCLB could depend on whether students were already being tested under similar accountability systems (Dee and Jacob, 2011; Dee, Jacob, & Schwartz, 2013) .
The early years of NCLB thus provide an important example of how variation in state policy implementation can cause a federal law to have very different consequences across the country. While previous studies have examined states' and schools' implementation of NCLB (Manna, 2006 (Manna, , 2010 Srikantaiah, 2009; Hamilton et al., 2007) , these studies each examine a limited number of states or localities. No prior study has used national data to examine the link between states' initial NCLB implementation decisions and their schools' ratings. In so doing, our work provides a concrete example of the effects of the expanding federal role within education (Cohen and Moffit, 2009; Henig, 2013; Manna, 2006 Manna, , 2010 .
Using a newly-assembled national data set, we investigate the following questions:
(1) Which types of schools failed during the early years of NCLB? How are student demographics, school grade levels, and schools' urbanicity related to failure rates?
(2) Which performance targets did schools fail to meet? Did schools frequently fail due to the performance of one student subgroup alone?
(3) What explains cross-state differences in school failure rates? Are these differences associated with student demographics or with specific state policy implementation decisions?
We find that wide cross-state differences in failure rates were largely the result of subtle differences in states' own NCLB rules. A common misconception regarding wide variation in AYP failure rates across states is that this variation was driven by more obvious state policy differences, such as the difficulty of the exam questions and the proficiency standards. In fact, school failure rates are only weakly related to student proficiency rates. A better understanding of how subtle policy differences influenced schools' ratings during the early years of NCLB may inform current efforts to reform NCLB and other school accountability programs. Even if states are given wide flexibility in the design of their accountability and testing systems, policy-makers may wish to remove loopholes that create disparate standards for schools via haphazard differences in rules and calculation methods. Flexibility need not come at the cost of transparency.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides an overview of NCLB policies, and Section III describes our data. Section IV describes which types of schools most frequently failed and which performance targets they failed to meet. Section V describes cross-state variation in school failure rates, Section VI explores reasons for this variation, and Section VII briefly discusses the implications for current policy decisions.
II. NCLB Overview
A school's performance rating under NCLB is based on student proficiency rates on statewide tests, student participation rates on those tests, and an additional state-selected indicator of student performance. 2 Both the campus as a whole and various student subgroupsracial/ethnic subgroups, students eligible for free/reduced priced lunch, students with limited English language proficiency, and students with disabilities-must meet all of the performance targets for the school to make AYP.
3 2 We provide a brief overview of NCLB in this section and refer the reader to the U.S. Department of Education's Desktop Reference (2002) and to Manna's Collision Course book (2010) for more details on NCLB policies. Manna also provides revealing anecdotes concerning the challenges faced by states and schools in implementing these policies.
3 Students are counted in all subgroups to which they belong. For example, a Hispanic student who is limited English proficient and eligible for free lunches will contribute to eight different proficiency rates-the campus-wide group, the Hispanic subgroup, the limited English proficient subgroup, and the free/reduced priced lunch subgroup proficiency rates in math and ELA. Subgroup proficiency rates only influence the school's AYP rating if there are
The three core mandatory elements of NCLB pertain to annual testing of virtually all public school students in certain grade levels and subjects, an increasing bar for the fraction of students demonstrating proficiency on these tests, and annual determinations of school performance with consequences for schools that fail to make AYP. NCLB required states to administer baseline student exams in the spring of 2002 and to adopt school accountability systems for the school year [2002] [2003] . States selected their own exams and defined proficiency on those exams. States then determined a schedule for the percentage of students who must meet proficiency each year, with targets increasing annually up to a mandated 100% target for 2014.
States could set different benchmarks by grade level and by subject area, but not by student subgroup. To prevent schools from strategically exempting low-performing students from taking exams, NCLB dictates that student subgroups are required to meet a 95% participation rate on both math and ELA exams. The final category of school performance is the state-selected "other" academic indicator. NCLB rules allowed for flexibility in states' selection of elementary and middle schools' other indicators, and most states used attendance rates. NCLB rules required that states use graduation rates for high schools' other indicator.
4
In addition to the stigma of failing to make AYP, there are additional consequences for schools serving low-income populations that receive funding under the federal Title I program.
Students at failing Title I schools have the opportunity to transfer to non-failing schools within the same district. After consecutive years of AYP failure, these schools' students from lowincome families are entitled to use school funds to purchase private tutoring services (called sufficient numbers of students enrolled at the school (and meeting the "continuous enrollment" definition described elsewhere in the paper). 4 Initially, NCLB permitted states to use their own formulae for calculating graduation rates. In December 2008, the U.S. Department of Education announced that all states must use a standardized four-year graduation rate formula. The U.S. DOE requested states implement the new formula as soon as possible but required states to comply by 2010 (U.S. DOE, 2008 .
"supplemental education services"). If these schools fail to make AYP for several years, then they are subject to closure or restructuring.
Beyond these core requirements, there are three key areas where states have latitude in calculating AYP. We summarize them here and provide further detail in the sections that follow.
The first area relates to acceptable adjustments to student proficiency rates under the law. Even if a subgroup's or school's performance falls below the proficiency target for the given school year, the school may still make AYP because NCLB allows states to employ various statistical techniques and contingencies to adjust proficiency rates. 5 Two types of adjustments permitted under NCLB are the application of confidence intervals and the use of "safe harbor."
Confidence intervals provide leniency around proficiency rate targets to account for small numbers of tested students. They lower a student group's effective proficiency targets based on the number of tested students in that group at that school-the smaller the group, the larger the confidence interval. 6 "Safe harbor" rules offered leniency to schools that missed proficiency targets but had students make large gains in proficiency rates from the previous year. To make AYP under the safe harbor rule, states typically require a 10% reduction in the fraction of students failing to reach proficiency. 5 Beyond the formal NCLB rules, states also allowed school districts and schools to submit appeals of schools' AYP ratings. Acceptable grounds for appeal varied by state. For example, in Colorado, schools could successfully appeal AYP failure if the sole reason for failure was the performance of the subgroup of students with disabilities and if this subgroup did meet its targets in another year. In several states, (e.g., Iowa and Michigan), schools could appeal by retroactively exempting students from contributing to participation rates if the students had experienced significant medical emergencies. 6 The confidence interval adjustment lowers the target from p to − [√ (1− ) * ], where p is the unadjusted proficiency rate target in decimal form, n is the number of students contributing to the proficiency rate, and C is the critical value for the specified confidence interval, such as states hold the same racial and ethnic subgroups of students separately accountable for meeting proficiency rate targets; for example, Asian American students might be a separate category in one state but not in another. In addition, states determine how long students must be enrolled in the same school for their test performance to contribute to schools' AYP determinations. These "continuously enrolled students" comprise the denominator of the participation rate calculation.
A state with a very strict definition of continuous enrollment only counts students enrolled at their schools for one calendar year prior to testing. More commonly, states count students who were tested in the spring and had been enrolled at their schools since late September or October.
Schools could also exempt students from contributing to participation rates if the students experienced significant medical emergencies. To protect student anonymity and avoid using unreliable measures of subgroup performance, the proficiency rate of a student subgroup only affected its school's AYP determination if the number of students in that subgroup exceeded a specific threshold. States had flexibility in choosing that minimum subgroup size threshold.
Most states chose a minimum subgroup size between 30 to 40 students, but the range extended from 5 students to 100 students. In some states, minimum group size was a function related to school population. For example, California's subgroups were held accountable if they either had 100 tested students or at least 50 tested students that composed at least 15% of the schools' total tested population.
A third, often-overlooked area of flexibility is which grade levels of students were tested and the methods of aggregating performance across grade levels. 
III. NCLB Data
NCLB has greatly expanded the amount of student performance data available to researchers and the public, though dissemination of data has been uneven across states. To promote studies of NCLB, we approached each of the 50 states individually in an attempt to form the most complete school-level data set concerning the early years of NCLB. We used a combination of methods to obtain the most comprehensive and accurate data possible-primarily requesting data directly from state education departments and downloading data from state websites.
The resulting school-level data set includes school-level AYP determinations and the subcomponents for these determinations. Our variables include indicators of whether the school as a whole and each individual student subgroup made AYP, school-and subgroup-level average student proficiency rates on state assessments, and the number of students tested in the school and in each student subgroup. 
IV. Descriptive Evidence on Failing Schools
Looking nationwide from 2003 to 2005, there were clear observable differences between AYP failing and non-failing schools (Table 1) . AYP failing schools were more likely to have higher total student enrollments, to have larger enrollments of poor and minority students, and to be designated as Title I schools. On average, schools that failed all three years had nearly double the percentage of students eligible for free and reduced-priced lunch as schools that made AYP all three years. Failing schools also had fewer teachers per student and were disproportionately located in urban school districts. Middle schools and high schools failed far more frequently than elementary schools.
Most schools failed to make AYP due to proficiency rate requirements as opposed to participation rates. The majority of failing schools had groups of students not meeting proficiency rate targets in both subjects. In 2005, 52% of failing schools missed proficiency rate targets in both subjects, 24% of failing schools missed ELA proficiency rate targets only, 20% of failing schools missed Math proficiency rate targets only, and the remaining 4% of failing schools satisfied all of their proficiency rate targets but not their participation rate targets. The number of schools failing due to participation alone was substantially lower in 2005 than in the prior two years, suggesting that schools took action to ensure that sufficient numbers of students were tested. 9 While schools were potentially accountable for many student subgroups, the rate at which different subgroups caused schools to fail AYP varied widely. Such differences could simply have been due to whether a subgroup was large enough to be held accountable. Figure 1 shows the percentage of schools where various subgroups counted toward AYP in 2004, as well as the rates at which these subgroups failed to make AYP. The total height of each bar illustrates the fraction of schools where that subgroup's proficiency rate counted towards the AYP determination, while the shaded areas of the bars represent the fraction of schools where that subgroup failed to make AYP. White and economically disadvantaged subgroups were held accountable in about 43% and 37% of schools, respectively, while fewer than 4% of schools had a Native American subgroup held accountable.
However, conditional on being accountable, subgroup failure rates varied considerably. Figure 1 reveals that White and Asian subgroups rarely failed, while more than half of all accountable Native American subgroups and students-with-disabilities subgroups failed to meet proficiency targets. The students-with-disabilities subgroup was also the most likely to be the only subgroup failing their schools' proficiency targets: 57% of accountable students-withdisabilities subgroups were the only group to fail to meet targets at their schools. A common misconception is that this wide variation in failure rates resulted from crossstate differences in the proportion of students identified as proficient. In reality, states' school failure rates were not strongly related to their students' performance. Figure 3 illustrates 12 The relationship with state ELA proficiency rates is also statistically insignificant and small, only a 0.16 percentage point decline in the fraction of schools making AYP. If we regress states' school AYP failure rates on quadratic terms for their states' proficiency rates in each subject (i.e., four independent variables total), the Rsquared is .07 but the adjusted R-squared is only .02. The joint significance level of these estimated coefficients is 0.56.
V. Cross-State Differences in Failure Rates

VI. Explaining Cross-State Variation in Failure Rates
Various dimensions of NCLB implementation contributed to the wide variation in school AYP failure rates. 13 No individual state policy decision appears to have been the primary culprit.
Instead, failure rates appear to have been influenced by interactions among several decisions and states' school characteristics (e.g., enrollment size, grade spans, ethnic diversity of students).
Given that we only have a sample of 50 states and a host of potentially important explanatory variables, there are insufficient degrees of freedom to tease out the relative importance of state policy variables via regression analysis. To examine the nature of these complex interactions,
we instead describe five categories of policy decisions that we have identified as having had substantial impacts on some states' school failure rates. We provide examples of states where failure rates were strongly influenced by these decisions. The first of these categories covers implementation errors that were rectified within the first couple of years of NCLB, but the remaining categories encompass policy decisions that continue to affect school failure rates. We focus on examples below, and Table 2 provides some relevant policy information for all fifty states. The states in Table 2 are sorted in ascending order by the percent of schools failing to make AYP in 2004. 3. Some states adopt homogenous targets across grade levels whereas others do not. As mentioned earlier, states were allowed to set grade-specific, subject-specific proficiency rate targets or could set uniform targets across grade levels and subjects. In most states, high school student proficiency rates were lower than those in younger grade levels.
Because proficiency targets were based on pre-NCLB performance levels, states setting uniform targets may have thus been setting up relatively easy targets for elementary and middle schools to reach-particularly if high school students' proficiency rates lagged far behind. Twenty-three states employed this policy. AYP, 17% of high schools failed, and the overall failure rate was 6% of schools.
Similarly, for Pennsylvania, only 7% of elementary schools failed to make AYP, 27% of high schools failed, and the overall failure rate was 15% of schools.
Setting a more easily obtained proficiency rate target for elementary and middle schools relative to high schools can lower states' school failure rates for both computational and meaningful reasons. On the purely computational side, high schools are larger and less numerous than elementary schools, so a relatively low elementary school failure rate means a low proportion of schools failing AYP even though the proportion of students in schools failing AYP may be much higher. But on a more substantive note, given the safe harbor policy, having fewer schools close to the margin for meeting their student proficiency rate targets can decrease school failure rates.
Schools that expect to perform close to their proficiency rate targets do not benefit from a safe harbor policy-if their proficiency rates improve from the prior year then they would already be meeting their proficiency targets without using safe harbor. Safe harbor is more likely to enable schools to make AYP if schools' proficiency rates are nowhere near the targets to begin with. So, all else equal, states will have lower school failure rates if they have more elementary and middle schools that will easily meet their proficiency targets even if they also have more high schools that are nowhere near these targets, since some of these high schools might still meet AYP via safe harbor.
South Carolina was operating an interim accountability system in the initial year of NCLB that provides a counterexample to Texas and Pennsylvania. South Carolina applied pre-NCLB proficiency rates of students in grades 3 to 8 to elementary, middle, and high schools, because South Carolina had not yet calculated high school proficiency rates for a sufficient number of prior years. Fewer students scored proficient or above in high schools than in elementary or middle schools, so applying the grades 3-8 proficiency rate as a baseline caused 97% of South Carolina's high schools to fail AYP in 2003.
When separate targets were established for high schools in 2004, the high school failure rate decreased to 52%.
States established different minimum subgroup sizes and held a different number of
subgroups accountable. The all or nothing nature of the AYP designations increases the risk of failure for schools with greater numbers of accountable student subgroups Staiger, 2002, 2003; Simms, 2013) . Within states, schools with a greater number of accountable subgroups were indeed more likely to fail AYP. Across states, there is a mild correlation between schools' average number of accountable student groups and their failure rates. But Figure 4 also reveals that this relationship would have been stronger if not for a few outliers-the low failure rates in Louisiana, Montana, and Texas. With these three outlier states omitted, the R-squared from the quadratic term regression jumps to .14, with a joint significance of .05. 24 The other policy implementation decisions described above created exceptionally low failure rates in these three states. Louisiana had low cutoffs for minimum subgroup size and thus had a larger number of accountable subgroups per school, but Louisiana used wide confidence intervals that, in combination with small subgroup sizes, made the effective proficiency target quite low. Texas used a uniform proficiency target across grade levels, resulting in extremely low failure rates among its elementary and middle schools. Montana did not use any minimum subgroup size, so subgroups would technically be held accountable even if there was only one student in that group. However, Montana's small schools and 95% confidence interval policy meant that subgroups were so small that they would make AYP even with few students passing.
Because the performance of the students-with-disabilities subgroup was often the only reason for a school failing to make AYP, one might expect states' policies toward this subgroup to influence their schools' failure rates. The fraction of schools with accountable subgroups will depend not only on states' minimum subgroup size rules but also on how they allocated students with disabilities across schools. School failure rates were initially higher in states with larger fractions of schools with accountable students- 
VII. Discussion
The early years of NCLB provide an important example of how variation in state policy implementation can cause a federal law to have very different consequences across the country.
Discrepancies in states' AYP formulae teach us that details have important ramifications.
Complex and off the radar of all but the most embedded policymakers and researchers, esoteric differences in rules had substantive impacts on schools due to the escalating sanctions under NCLB. Purposefully or not, some states took advantage of loopholes that made it much easier for schools to meet targets. Variation in these rules has only increased in recent years, as some states have received waivers allowing their schools to avoid failure designations even if their students do not reach 100% proficiency by 2014 (Riddle & Kober, 2012; U.S. DOE, 2012) .
These waivers are idiosyncratic to each state, so that cross-state variation in the minutia of accountability policy rules is as complicated and important as ever (Polikoff et al., 2014) .
While flexibility may be a positive aspect of NCLB or other school accountability systems, many of the discrepancies in states' NCLB rules reflect arbitrary differences in statistical formulae rather than substantive policy disagreements. When states and districts design test-based accountability policies, schools may be best served by a consistent set of directions about acceptable statistical practices and common definitions. The federal government could convene a panel of experts or commission a professional association such as the American Statistical Association to provide guidance on sound statistical practices related to confidence interval setting, safe harbor exceptions, and minimum subgroup sizes. Formulae for these procedures, if used, could then be standardized. These formulas themselves attempt to adjust evaluation to treat schools in a fair and just manner. Standardizing rules for exceptions and adjustments does not eliminate this quest for fairness. Rather, using uniform accounting practices might promote transparency and better insulate state accountability systems from the political whims of governors and state legislatures. While our own analysis does not investigate whether arbitrary differences across states were harmful, we are hard-pressed to think of a compelling reason why citizens should prefer these arbitrary differences in accounting.
Even after statistical definitions are standardized, school accountability policies could still provide states and districts with discretion in their substantive choices of how to measure school effectiveness and which sanctions or rewards to attach to performance outcomes. Ideally, consequences for schools in an accountability system should be linked to student learning rather than the idiosyncrasies of state rules. This ideal might be better served if the federal government offered states a selection from a menu of accountability systems, while maintaining precise definitions and formulae within each of these systems. When we aggregate proficiency rates to the state level for the x-axis, we weight schools by their number of tested students. For 12 states that failed to report the number of tested students by school, we use schools' student enrollment in tested grades as reported in the Common Core of Data as a proxy for the number of students tested. 
